Stressing the inßuence of expected devaluation on currency crises, this paper shows that, in a Þxed exchange-rate system with an escape clause, partial delegation of exchange-rate policy to an inßation-averse central banker reduces the probability of crisis.
Introduction
A well-known result in the literature on currency crisis is that the cost of defending a Þxed rate increases when private agents expect a devaluation (Krugman, 1998) . In this context, this paper considers partial delegation of exchange-rate policy to a central banker who is more inßation averse than the government: the decision as to whether to maintain the peg is left to the government, but the magnitude of any realignment is delegated to the central banker. Looking at the inßuence of expected devaluation, it shows that, in a Þxed exchangerate system with an escape clause, this partial delegation reduces the probability of crisis.
In particular, it underlines the fact that it is more effective to devolve exchange-rate policy when private agents expect a future realignment, as the reduction of the probability of crisis is greater. These results are strengthened if the central banker's degree of inßation aversion is greater, for the probability of self-fulÞlling crisis is reduced and the stability of the Þxed exchange-rate system increased.
Partial delegation 2.1 The model
The framework is based on a model of currency crisis à la Obtsfeld (1994). In a small open economy, the log of employment n can be expressed by
where Π and Π e denote actual and expected inßation. The natural employment rate n * is assumed to be zero. Inßation expectations are formed at the beginning of the period as private agents sign nominal contracts. Then Þrms determine the demand for labor and the policy maker decides whether to maintain the peg.
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) holds. Foreign prices are exogenous and normalized to 1.
Control of exchange-rate variations ∆e and of the inßation rate Π are therefore equivalent.
The aim of exchange-rate or monetary policy is to minimize deviations of inßation and employment from their target levels. The loss functions of the government and the central banker are respectively
The target level of employment e n is above the natural rate, and so can be interpreted as an inßationary bias. The inßation target is zero. C represents the realignment cost incurred by the policy maker (in terms of credibility for instance) after the abandonment of the peg.
Consequently, Ω is a binary variable equal to 0 when the policy maker maintains the peg and equal to 1 when he devalues. We assume partial delegation of exchange-rate policy to a central banker who has the same targets as the policy maker but who places greater weight on the costs of higher inßation (ε > 0). 1 There is no cost of realignment to the central banker because it is the government that decides whether realignment occurs. Therefore, when the policy maker decides to devalue, exchange-rate policy is delegated to the central banker and
∆e is determined such that
The more the central banker is inßation averse (ε high), the smaller is the inßuence of inßationary expectations and the employment target on the devaluation rate.
Information available for the formation of inßation expectations is the same as that for the policy maker except that private agents do not know the realignment cost C. Therefore, they cannot perfectly forecast the Þnal decision of the policy maker. If economic agents expect the maintenance of the peg, then Π e = 0. If they expect a devaluation, Π e = Π, that is,
Inßation expectations increase with the inßationary bias e n while they decrease with the central banker's degree of inßation aversion.
The realignment condition and effects of partial delegation
When the government defends the peg, it follows that Π = ∆e = 0. When it proceeds to a realignment, Π is expressed by equation (4) . Inserting (1) into (2), the government's loss in the two respective situations is found as
1 The delegation is partial as there is a cost to the government when a realignment occurs. To take this cost into account, the decision as to whether to maintain the peg is left to the government, but the magnitude of any realignment is delegated to the central banker.
This loss depends positively on inßation expectations and the inßationary bias. As a result, the policy maker will decide to devalue if
This inequality indicates that the probability of realignment increases when expected inßa-tion and the inßationary bias are higher and when the realignment cost C is smaller.
Taking into account inßation expectations, thresholds under which the government will decide to devalue are equal to
is the threshold which prevails when private agents expect no devaluation (Π e = 0),
is the threshold which prevails when private agents expect a realignment (Π e = Π).
Note that C . Therefore, if C belongs to this interval, the government can either defend the peg or realign. The decision depends on private agents'
expectations. This implies that crises are self-fulÞlling.
We consider here delegation to a central banker who is more inßation averse than the government. ε = 0 represents the case of no delegation as then government and central banker have exactly the same preferences and targets. Let C
ND i
, where i = 1, 2, denote thresholds obtained when the government does not delegate exchange-rate policy. Putting ε = 0 into (9) and (10),
Note that C This proposition is conÞrmed by the following inequality.
So, whatever private agents' expectations, with partial delegation to a more inßation-averse central banker, the probability of crisis is reduced. The policy maker maintains the peg while the cost of realignment is smaller. This result can be explained by the negative (downward)
inßuence of partial delegation on expected inßation. As the cost of defending a Þxed rate decreases when private agents expect its maintenance, the probability of crisis is reduced.
This suggests that the effect of partial delegation on the probability of crisis is more effective when private agents expect a future realignment. This idea is conÞrmed by the proposition below.
Proposition 2. Partial delegation of exchange-rate policy to a more inßation-averse central banker decreases the gap between the two thresholds.
This proposition gives additional information concerning the evolution of thresholds.
Proposition 1 indicates that, with partial delegation, the probability of crisis is reduced at each threshold. Proposition 2 speciÞes that the probability of crisis is reduced more at C
. Therefore, as the peg is more fragile at C
W D 2
and the strategy of partial delegation more efficient, expectations of devaluation strengthen the need of implementing this strategy. It is conÞrmed by the following inequality.
As illustrated in Figure 1 , the area of multiple equilibria is reduced. We write 1 when the government devalues and 0 when it defends the peg. The Þrst number indicates the policy maker's decision in the case of no delegation and the second number the policy maker's decision when exchange-rate policy is partially delegated to a more inßation-averse central banker. 
depends on the value of ε. Using (9) and (10), we Þnd
Thus, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The more the central banker is inßation averse, i) the lower is the level of thresholds;
ii) the smaller is the gap between the two thresholds.
This last proposition means that, whatever inßation expectations, the probability of crisis decreases with the central banker's degree of inßation aversion and that the magnitude of this reduction is higher when private agents expect a devaluation. If ε is very high, expected inßation is close to zero (see (5) then becomes smaller than C ND 1 . Self-fulÞlling crises are avoided. One threshold remains at which the probability of crisis is considerably reduced.
